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Abstract : Are present-day families still like those described by sociology in the middle 
of the 20th century or have they changed beyond resemblance ? The media and much of 
the popular perceptions along with them have long ago opted for an « all-change » per-
spective on contemporary patterns of living together; the sociological literature is di-
vided between diagnostics of change and diagnostics of resilience. A recent study of 
intra-couple dynamics in Switzerland shows the existence of a large array of couples’ 
internal structures of regulation, but with a persistent core of traditionalism. The con-
cept of master status is used to interpret the fact that major changes point less towards 
clear-cut egalitarianism, which could be an alternative to traditional gender structures, 
than towards a traditionally biased « synthesis » that could be paradoxically called mo-
dernized family traditionalism. 
 
 
1. « The Parsonian family is dead » - is it? 
Modern family sociology mainly developed in the middle of the 20th century, in a pe-
riod of stability (for countries like the USA or even Switzerland) or of social reconstruc-
tion after the Second world war (as for most other European countries). This develop-
ment took place under the aegis of the then dominating functionalist paradigm (Par-
sons & Bales 1955, Goode 1963). Its basic model was that of the nuclear family, a couple 
of two adult partners living together with their children and forming an irreducible 
group securing fundamental tasks for social and hence societal integration, especially 
through socialization, a group that functioned in a relatively autonomous way, with 
little intimate contacts beyond its borders, which made it particularly attuned to the 
flexibility required by the industrial society. The internal structure of this family model 
was mainly organized around two ascribed criteria, sex and age. The role attribution ac-
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cording to the sex of the adult partners - internal tasks for the wife, external tasks for 
the husband - was said to correspond to expressive vs. instrumental orientations typical 
of sexual identities and was interpreted to be a highly functional way of performing all 
the necessary contributions to family and societal functioning. 
This endemic view of what many family ideologists liked to call the « basic cell of socie-
ty » was increasingly faced by two main challenges. The one was the early feminist cri-
tique of the functionalist model's veiling and justifying of women's exploitation by men, 
and pseudoscientifically glorifying discriminative practices by presenting them as func-
tional necessities for the whole society as well as optimal solutions for the intrinsic iden-
tities of the individuals (Friedan 1963). The other challenge was the increasing evidence 
of variations and changes that became important enough to express themselves in de-
mographical time series in all highly industrialized countries. It is true that this evi-
dence did not really attest to the intrinsic stability of the family model, supposed to be 
dominant, and to its particularly good adjustment to the needs of the industrial society 
(Goode 1963). Since the 60ies, divorce rates rose, marriage rates plunged, fertility rates 
fell as well, often far below the level of demographic reproduction, and atypical family 
situations appeared increasingly or were increasingly identified as such (single parent, 
especially single mother families, children born out of wedlock and often to teenager 
mothers, non-marital cohabitation, homosexual couples, recomposed families, couples 
living apart together, not to speak of more basically different domestic units such as 
communes ; Roussel 1989, Sardon 2000, specifically for Switzerland Calot et al. 1998).ii A 
complementary long-term change is the increasing participation in the labor-force by 
women after the Second World War (during the first half of the 20th century, the rate of 
female employment decreased). Demographic data are not the only indicators of fami-
ly-relevant change, norms and values are also concerned. To mention but one example : 
the values mobilized in order to find partners show a pattern of change similar to the 
general change of values identified by Inglehart in various publications (Inglehart 1971, 
1977, 1990), as Buchmann and Eisner (1997) have nicely shown in a content analysis of 
contact ads in two relatively class-specific (one lower, one middle class) Swiss-German 
newspapers over almost the entire 20th century (1900 through 1992). 
Following these signs of recent temporal variation, discourses about family change 
have developed vigorously both in- and outside sociology, especially since the 80ies 
(Cherlin 1981, 1992; Popenoe 1993; Beck 1986; Beck-Gernsheim 1998, 2000, and many 
others). A typical summary statement is, e.g., Cherlin’s remark that the title of his re-
edited book on « Marriage, Divorce, Remarriage » should rather read « Cohabitation, 
Marriage, Divorce, More Cohabitation, and Probably Remarriage » (Cherlin's introduc-
tion, 1992). Teachman et al. (2000) write squarely that « nuclear families consisting of 
two heterosexual parents, biologically related children, fathers who are in the paid la-
bor force, and mothers who are homemakers have declined to the point of being a mi-
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nority circumstance in our society ». While it seems at least plausible that some of the 
changes have been more pronounced in the USA, most of them appear also in European 
societies. However, European sociologists have probably reacted more vigorously to 
this discourse of « Family Diversity as the Norm » (subtitle of Peterson & Steinmetz 
1999) than their American colleagues, possibly because traditional family constellations 
show more resilience in Europe (Bertram 1991; de Singly 1991; Hettlage 1992; Vaskovics 
1994 ; a more change-convinced stance for European countries can be found in Cromp-
ton 1999). 
Without questioning the reality and relevance of demographic indications of change in 
family-related behavior, we have to admit that they can not directly prove even the ma-
jor part of the far-reaching conclusions they often motivate. Although aggregated time 
series say certainly something about the cumulated stability or variation of individual 
arrangements in general, they say very little about individual trajectories, forms of co-
habitation, and their significance. To mention only one specific example : in several Eu-
ropean countries, the alleged « new » family form of non-married cohabitation can be 
shown to constitute a new and by now widely practiced early phase in individual life 
courses, preceding more classical phases of family formation, rather than an lasting al-
ternative to these (for Switzerland, see Levy et al. 1997; Kellerhals et al. 2003). A more 
substantial argument must be added: the personal composition of a social group, in-
cluding the family, may perfectly change without the group’s structure changing. 
Changes in a group’s composition may strongly affect personal relationships, especially 
in such an emotionally loaded primary group as a couple or a family, but recomposition 
may very well take place under the same structural arrangement, if by this term we 
mean role definitions, power relationships, territorial and systemic boundaries, and the 
like. A direct consequence of this consideration is that rising divorce rates say nothing 
about structural change in couples - they might even say more about the absence of 
such change while personal norms and aspirations evolve.iii 
So what is really happening to couples and families? More specifically: what changes 
can be demonstrated with respect to their sexual order? And even more specifically, 
thinking of the traditional model of family organization: what has changed with respect 
to the sexual division of work for the family? 
The descriptive exploration called for by these questions implies a series of theoretical 
queries: how do couples organize, and as a function of what? There are series of specific 
theories frequently used to explain the division of what Coltrane (2000) calls « routine 
family work », or in an even larger perspective the division of all work for the family, 
paid and unpaid. At least five theoretical approaches can be distinguished in the actual 
research literature : human capital or new home economics (starting with Becker’s 1981 
classic), postulating that men and women allocate their time to different kinds of tasks 
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or activities according to the principle of optimizing their returns ; time constraints or 
time availability (sometimes also called demand/response capability or situational ap-
proach, Coverman 1985, England & Farkas 1986) postulating – put somewhat bluntly - 
that the volume of time needed for the family depends on the number and the age of 
the children present in the household while the number of hours effectively spent in 
this area depends on what employed work leaves available ; gender-role attitudes with 
socialization and sex-role ideology as a background,iv postulating that gender differ-
ences in task allocation result from the socialized gender norms of both partners and/or 
from their responding to known role expectations in their wider social environment ; 
gender performance or doing gender (West & Zimmerman 1987), postulating that gender 
differences, including family tasks, are actively performed constructions of identity dif-
ferentiation, including the possibility that the very scriptedness of identities varies be-
tween the sexes (as, e.g., Chodorow 1978 postulates for mothering and fathering) ; and 
the very classical resource theory (Blood & Wolfe 1960 and many later authors), postulat-
ing that not only power differentials between the partners, but also task distribution 
between them are conditioned by their relative resource contribution (implying that 
family work is less satisfying than employed work and is therefore left to the partner 
with less resources and hence less power for internal negotiations).  
There is neither room nor need here to discuss the merits, drawbacks and empirical rel-
evance of these approaches. Various excellent overviews and discussions already exist, 
at least for English publications (Shelton & John 1996, Shelton 1999, Bielby 1999, Col-
trane 2000). They all have their raison d’être, as well as all of them are known to be only 
moderately supported – but nevertheless supported – by empirical data, which makes 
them all look partial and possibly complementary (as most recent overviews underline ; 
e.g., Coltrane 2000, Shelton 1999). Moreover, all of them are more or less clearly limited 
to a micro-social level (interpersonal interactions, exchanges or negotiations) as they 
focus on various mechanisms of individual or interpersonal behavior. This behavior is 
seen as motivated by such factors as norm conformism, identity expression or interest, 
and – at least implicitly - as being acted out in a given context that sets different incen-
tives for various behavioral alternatives. The context itself, i.e., the social-structural set-
up of the environment in which people and couples live, appears as a « given » outside 
the explanatory models, as these barely focus on the context’s structure and its sex-
discriminating features. Against this backdrop, we wish to relate our analysis to a larger 
theoretical perspective, starting with more general questions and approaches, four of 
which we spell out, without deriving hypotheses, however, since our method, although 
basically quantitative, is inspired by an exploratory approach. 
Do couples and families constitute autonomous systems, unfolding their proper sys-
temic logic, as the theory of autopoïetic systems (Luhmann 1995) would have it? Do the 
partners rather construct their own private universe on the basis of their personal 
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norms and convictions (that may of course be influenced by their cultural background), 
as a constructivist perspective like that of Berger & Kellner (1964) would postulate? 
Does their internal organization reflect a balance between the resources each of the 
partners contributes, as resource theory hypothesizes (Blood and Wolfe 1960)? Or are 
they adapting to external conditions, to the constraints, options and rhythms of their 
socio-institutional environment, as recent research leads one to believe (Krüger & Levy 
2001)?  
If the self-organizing process prevails, we should expect all families to take the same 
shape without respect to any other factor, since in this perspective « a family is a fami-
ly » , i.e., there is no a priori internal source of variation that could differentiate au-
topoïetic processes between individual families, at least if they have the same basic 
composition. If the constructionist view is correct – which postulates in fact another, 
agency-centered variant of self-organization - we should expect that the partners’ fami-
ly norms are strongly related to their family’s actual organization, much more so than 
more structural variables. If external factors are important, there should be associations 
with these factors, i.e., with partners’ external status positions in the case of the Blood & 
Wolfe hypothesis, and with more institutional elements, possibly hard to identify, in the 
case of the institutional adaptation hypothesis, personal norms notwithstanding.  
While these hypotheses concern the internal functioning of the family and its relation to 
external, societal factors, European sociology has also been the arena of much debate 
about a so-called second wave of modernization supposed to take place in post-
industrial societies (Beck 1986, Giddens 1984). This modernization is said to have revo-
lutionized the existing forms of living, alone, in partnerships or as single parents. This 
kind of hypothesis concerns temporal variation, predicting increasing diversification of 
these forms, dissolving pre-existing patterns of standardization. 
We shall approach these hypotheses mainly on the basis of a recent survey on family 
functioning in Switzerland and do so in an exploratory perspective. Even if it is a part 
of the problem under study, the distinction of areas internal and external to the family 
is also convenient for the organization of our argument.v Consequently, we shall first 
examine intrafamilial aspects, i.e., the gendered attribution of internal tasks and deci-
sions on the levels of practice and of norms, and secondly extrafamilial participation, 
where we shall concentrate on the most important extrafamilial area, i.e., employment, 
and then look at the interconnections between male and female participations and their 
variations through the life course, focusing our attention on the importance and distri-
bution of work in- and outside the family. We shall start with a short examination of the 
modernization hypothesis, for which we use supplementary data, and then proceed to 
the more analytical hypotheses. 
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2. An empirical exploration in Switzerland: concepts and data 
The main data we shall use for our purpose stem from a large survey of couples in 
Switzerland. Both senior authors of this study, having examined family and gender re-
lationships in Switzerland since the 70ies (Held and Levy 1974, Kellerhals 1982), were 
relatively skeptical about postmodernist interpretations of family change. One of our 
objectives was therefore to explore to what degree certain forms of couple or family or-
ganization could be identified that did clearly not correspond to the traditional model. 
Even if the precise definition of this traditional model may be less than consensual and 
clearly defined in the literature, it seems safe to say that social history (Mitterauer 1979, 
1984) and functionalist theory (Parsons & Bales 1955) have identified a specific organi-
zational model with respect to the dimensions we call regulation rather than those we 
call cohesion.vi Regulation is an umbrella term for the various aspects of how a couple 
organizes and coordinates its members' actions or what we may call the everyday pro-
duction of family life. We distinguish three basic aspects of regulation: role definitions, 
hierarchy, and routinization. The notion of role definitions can be further differentiated 
into relational aspects (who behaves how towards the other and the group) and instru-
mental ones (who does what). Hierarchy relates to the aspect of dominance or equality 
between the partners and need not be differentiated here on theoretical grounds. How-
ever, we may distinguish different operational approaches to identify the power posi-
tion of a person, following the classical methodological distinction of decisional, posi-
tional and reputational power.vii By routinization we mean the degree to which a couple 
has established fixed rules concerning the territories and rhythms of its daily life. The 
following analysis will concentrate on the most usual regulative aspects of family func-
tioning : task attribution and power differentiation.viii The various ways in which men 
and women combine labor market and family participation will be called their specific 
participation profile.  
As already stated, the data to be used stem mainly from our recent nationwide study of 
couple dynamics in Switzerland that included 1534 couples, with both partners inter-
viewed separately by telephone (CATI) in 1998 (Kellerhals et al. 2003). Various dimen-
sions of couple functioning (cohesion and regulation) were analyzed as such and in re-
lation to social status, social (extrafamilial) participation, and social time or life-course 
positioning, as well as their connection to problems, conflicts, coping and the quality of 
the couple's life. The sample definition included all couples in Switzerland living to-
gether since at least one year whose younger partner was aged between 20 and 70; they 
could be married or not, nationals or foreigners. The response rate of 31% of the couples 
was moderately satisfactory as such, but we could hardly expect more given the neces-
sity to interview both partners.ix Our checks of distributional representativeness yielded 
very satisfying results, with only a slight (and common) indication of overre-
presentation of middle and upper middle social strata. Some other data, stemming from 
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older studies, will be used only for an introductory temporal comparison at the begin-
ning of the next section. 
As already stated, the aim of the following analyses is rather an exploration than a strict 
testing of hypotheses. Accordingly, we refrain from using advanced methods of statisti-
cal analysis and rely on more exploratory techniques. 
 
3. The family: still a gendered work place 
3.1 Traditional task attributions 
As a first approach to our topic, taking up the modernization hypothesis, let us look at 
the recent evolution of the factual division of family workx and then at norms concern-
ing it. Unfortunately, there exists no single, homogenous data series in Switzerland 
about factual aspects of (internal) family regulation.xi On a very descriptive and spotty 
level however, four studies that have used identical or similar questions concerning 
task allocation and decisional attribution in couples offer an opportunity for a trend 
estimate. Table 1 shows those task items from the four surveys that are more or less 
comparable between 1971 and 1998.xii 
A quick look at the frequencies reveals some moderate tendencies towards less sex ty-
ping of task allocation in such items  as administrative contacts, gifts, holidays, cleaning, 
but there seems to be a hard core of tasks showing very little change (cooking meals, 
washing) ; overall, the observed changes over almost three decades are not spectacular 
and certainly do not corroborate current, highly mediatised ideas about modernization 
and widespread egalitarianism. Moreover, they may be partly due to the generalization 
of the norm of gender equality, belonging to the realm of declared political correctness, 
whatever the personal practice may be. Nevertheless, it seems safe to say that overall, 
the practical sex-typing of family tasks according to the interviewed partners remains 
through the past thirty years, despite some weak signs of decrease, especially if we take 
into account that even granting for a less than «  representative selection «  of masculine 
and feminine items in our questionnaire, the latter concern much more regular and 
time-consuming tasks than the former (such as administrative contacts or repairs) and 
thus weigh heavier in the partners’ time and energy budgets. 
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Table 1 : Items of gendered task allocation in couples (who does what), 1971-1998 
(Switzerland ; line percent)xiii 
 
  Men Women 
Activity/task Year man joint woman N man joint woman N 
contact with authorities 1971 78 13 9 959 - - - - 
- 1980 - - - - - - - - 
administrative work 1991 53 25 22 481 34 27 39 489 
taxes, bills, budget 1998 51 20 29 1534 43 24 32 1534 
repairs 1971 74 14 11 962 - - - - 
- 1980 - - - - - - - - 
repairs 1991 81 12 7 479 68 21 11 487 
repairs/car maintenance 1998 79 13 9 1534 68 24 8 1534 
gifts 1971 3 16 79 962 - - - - 
- 1980 - - - - - - - - 
gifts 1991 2 37 61 480 3 25 73 492 
- 1998 - - - - - - - - 
prepare holidays 1971 19 57 15 961 - - - - 
- 1980 - - - - - - - - 
figure out holidays 1991 19 63 18 464 12 67 22 460 
- 1998 - - - - - - - - 
smooth conflicts 1971 15*) 53*) 10*) 960 - - - - 
- 1980 - - - - - - - - 
- 1991 - - - - - - - - 
calm quarrels 1998 39 37 25 1534 31 34 35 1534 
- 1971 - - - - - - - - 
meals (cook) 1980 9 16 75 597 10 15 75 597 
meals 1991 5 15 80 481 5 12 83 489 
meals, shopping 1998 7 23 71 1534 3 18 80 1534 
- 1971 - - - - - - - - 
clean (tidy up) 1980 7 10 83 598 7 13 80 598 
- 1991 - - - - - - - - 
range, clean, wash dishes 1998 5 21 74 - 2 19 79 - 
- 1971 - - - - - - - - 
wash 1980 4 4 92 599 3 4 92 593 
- 1991 - - - - - - - - 
washing, ironing 1998 2 5 94 1534 3 5 93 1534 
 
*) + 10% no conflicts 
Obviously, there is a dimension of inequality hidden behind the apparently « horizon-
tal » aspect of labor division between the partners in a couple. A common way of quan-
tifying possible inequalities of male and female engagement in family work is to count 
the weekly hours spent at it. While being purely « quantitative » and possibly submit-
ted to subjective distortions, this indicator has various advantages : unlike the domain-
specific task items, it is synthetic, as respondents have to intuitively add up the whole 
relevant work if asked to give an overall estimate. It is probably also less exposed to 
social desirability than specific tasks.xiv Unfortunately, we found no longitudinally 
comparable data about hours of domestic work in Switzerland for a substantial peri-
od,xv but it is interesting to look at the present situation. An estimation of hours of 
household work done by men and women with the data from our 1998 survey shows 
an overall difference, measured by way of median values, of 29.3 for women and 10.0 
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for men. We find consistently high correlations of the hourly predominance of female 
family work and the sex-typing of the four female tasks considered (  between .35 and 
.47) and zero correlations with the two male tasks (  = .06 and .02).xvi Although we can-
not use the hours indicator for the assessment of historical change, we shall concentrate 
on this measure in our later analyses since it synthesizes at a time the degree of sex-
typing of family tasks and its inegalitarian component. 
Concerning norms about task allocation, the empirical situation is even more sketchy 
and does not warrant a table. Some existing results warn us not to suppose too simple 
trends. Held & Levy (1983) showed for a five-year period in the 70ies (1971-1976) in-
verse changes when comparing two types of contexts in Switzerland : the acceptance of 
traditional sex role definitions (norms of strict role segregation) increased in urban con-
texts (where their acceptance was moderate) whereas it decreased in rural contexts 
(where the acceptance was high). It may well be that both changes, adding up to a 
movement of ideological convergence between the two types of contexts during the 
70ies, can be interpreted as early reactions to the rise of the second wave of militant 
feminism in the first half of the seventies and the public debates it spurred ; it is more 
than plausible that since then, people’s norms have evolved towards more egalitarian-
ism.xvii As of 1998, our data point to the existence of a generalized norm of gender equal-
ity that belongs to the realm of well-anchored political correctness, but does not neces-
sarily correspond to actual practice. Faced with the question of whether a mother of 
school-children should remain completely at home, work part-time in favor of her fami-
ly duties, share equally part-time work and family work with the man, or whether he 
should be more at home, less than one percent of both the men and the women opted 
for the « man more at home » variant – ostensibly, it appears to be simply outlandish. 
Women's answers were equally distributed between the other three possibilities (which 
means that one third was in favor of complete segregation in this phase of family life, 
another third for reduction of her employment to part-time) while an even greater ma-
jority of the men preferred the mother at home (41.0% completely, 27.1% in part). All 
these observations point consistently to two conclusions : first, that traditional norms of 
sex-specific assignment of employment and family tasks did loose some of their consen-
sus, but are far from having disappeared, and second, that the distinction between a 
normatively rejected inequality and a more acceptable « difference » should not be ne-
glected. 
Our analyses published elsewhere (Kellerhals et al. 2003) show a strong component of 
normative conformism in both the normative and descriptive items about sexual task 
attribution (but even more so for items directly expressing inequality), backing the 
statement about their expressing political correctness as much as action-oriented per-
sonal convictions. xviii Even though our evidence remains an indirect proof, it indicates 
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that in the area of discriminative gender differences, the (declared) norms have become 
more egalitarian than the practice.  
 
3.2 Traditional decision patterns 
The other classical area of regulation, power distribution between the partners, is ideo-
logically more touchy as it focuses more explicitly on the question of inequality ; for this 
and other reasons, its operationalization is more problematic. Here again, only a 
sketchy comparison of different points in time is possible (table 2). All the items used by 
these studies can be seen in the operational tradition initiated by Blood & Wolfe (1960). 
With respect to the classical distinction of the community power methodology, they 
correspond to the decisional approach to power assessment. 
Overall, the tendencies point towards slightly more joint decisions over the last thirty 
years (items : husband’s job and insurance, but the latter mainly in men’s perception ; 
for car/important purchase it is doubtful whether the difference is real since the items 
are semantically not quite equivalent ; the difference is inversed for holidays and there 
is no clear difference for wife’s job and eating expenses). The only indication that explic-
itly shows a case of stable sex typing is related to insurance with a slight decline of mas-
culine preponderance. In our 1998 survey, the tendency towards equality in the appre-
ciation of seven decision items was manifest, even in those with clearly recognizable sex 
typing ; e.g., to arrange or furnish one’s home is the woman’s decision for 53% of the 
men and 45% of the women, but for 40%/49% of them it is a joint decision. This could 
be seen as a fair description of these couples’ practice, but our tests show again that the 
extent of declared equality is quite strongly influenced by the respondents’ normative 
conformism (see the explanation in relation with the next table). All this sums up to a 
situation where a clear change in favor of less sex typing of important couple or family 
decisions or a tipping of the balance in favor of the woman cannot be asserted (see also 
Höpflinger 1986 for a more rigorous comparison over the period between 1971 and 
1980, yielding similar conclusions). 
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Table 2 : Items of decisional power distribution in couples (who decides what), 
1971-1998 (Switzerland) xix 
 
  Men Women 
Decision issue Year man joint woman N man joint woman N 
buy life insurance 1971 58 39 3 963 45 50 5 951 
buy life insurance 1980 - 46 -  - 55 -  
- 1991 - - - - - - - - 
Choose/change insur. 1998 39 52 9 1534 39 53 8 1534 
husband change job  1971 69 28 3 924 59 38 2 951 
husband change job  1980 - 43 -  - 47 -  
- 1991 - - - - - - - - 
- 1998 - - - - - - - - 
wife get job 1971 33 35 30 963 10 46 44 950 
wife get job 1980 - 47 -  - 50 -  
- 1991 - - - - - - - - 
- 1998 - - - - - - - - 
expenses for eating 1971 10 41 48 955 10 41 48 941 
expenses for eating 1980 - 45 -  - 49 -  
- 1991 - - - - - - - - 
- 1998 - - - - - - - - 
buy car 1971 50 47 2 962 49 49 2 949 
buy car 1980 - 54 -  - 56 -  
- 1991 - - - - - - - - 
important purchase 1998 12 84 4 1534 9 86 5 1534 
- 1971 - - - - - - - - 
determine holidays 1980 - 88 -  - 82 -  
- 1991 - - - - - - - - 
choose type of holiday 1998 11 72 17 1534 12 74 14 1534 
The measurement of decisional power has been highly controversial in the literature; 
several theoretical and technical questions are almost impossible to solve. Inspired by 
an idea of Eichler (1973), we have developed a complementary measure that tries to tap 
a more intricate meaning of family power: to what extent are there forms of dependence 
between the partners? This idea is an attempt to grapple with conceptual problems that 
plague measures of power used by research in the resource theory perspective. First, at 
least in principle, there is no reason intrinsic to Blood & Wolfe’s thesis to rely heavily or 
even exclusively on income or financial resources as a possible reason for internal 
asymmetries; other types of resources could obey to the same theoretical logic, provid-
ed they are central enough to the couple’s functioning or « common weal ». But it is dif-
ficult to ascertain and quantify emotional, ideological or relational resources of each 
partner in a way that allows to compare them according to the objectivist logic of « who 
contributes more » implied by resource theory. Second, there may be an important, but 
variable difference between a partner’s amount of a given resource (status position, cul-
tural capital or whatever may be considered), and his or her effective contribution of 
this resource to the couple’s life ; what is more important, potential or effective resource 
contribution ? Third, it is even more difficult to determine in a non-normative way 
which of the partners’ « goods » or « services » or « capacities » constitute relevant re-
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sources that should theoretically influence the couple's power balance. Fourth, even 
supposing they are measured correctly, it is questionable whether an objectivist com-
parison of the respective resources corresponds to the couples' reality as partners may 
define their proper, private equilibrium in a way that is not adequately indicated by 
equal « quantities » of a given resource. Asking in terms of (inter-)dependence could 
then be closer to the reality of a couple's everyday life and mutual evaluation ; this 
strategy can be seen as an adaptation of the positional approach to power assessment in 
the context of the family. xx Our question was asked for six areas and ran as follows: « To 
live as a couple means often to depend on the other, and this can be different for vari-
ous areas. Would you say you depend on your partner in one of the follow areas? ». For 
each area (see table 3), respondents had to choose between four answers, « You depend 
and that's OK for you », « You depend and resent it », « Partner depends and that's OK 
for you », « Partner depends and you resent it » . Two more answers were coded sepa-
rately when given spontaneously without having been explicitly offered to the re-
spondents: « No one depends » and « Each depends on the other ».xxi 
Even more than in the previous cases, the answer distributions point to a strong norm 
of equilibrium or independence: in four of the six areas, the two very answers that have 
not been explicitly mentioned and express two different forms of equality occur most 
often ! Only in the two most factual and instrumental areas (housework and finances) 
do we find relatively high rates of asymmetric, sex-typed answers - and these two are 
also the most directly relevant ones for the traditional stereotype of the family, i.e., a 
strict role segregation along the public/private or external/internal divide. The ten-
dency to avoid sex typification of equality-sensitive areas also appears in the fact that in 
the vast majority of those cases where one or the other direction of dependence is ad-
mitted, the no-problem version of the answer comes up much more frequently than the 
problem version. A comparison of the partners' answers (the gamma coefficients in ta-
ble 3) shows little divergence, especially no clear dissension. In fact, it is extremely rare 
that one partner states one direction of dependence and the other the opposite; if one 
kind of dependence is mentioned by one partner only, the other will rather tend to 
claim equality. A further indication of the strong normative component of these an-
swers comes from our attempt at controlling the respondents' normative conformism or 
sensibility to social desirability: strongly conformist respondents give more answers of 
equality (independence or mutual dependence) than weakly conformist respondents. 
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Table 3: Perception of (inter-)dependence by men and women, six areas (Switzer-
land 1998) 
 
 
Areas of possible 
dependence 
Res- 
pon- 
dent 
She 
depends 
He de-
pends 
Neither 
depends 
Both 
depend 
equally 
Total (N) Couples' 
consen-
sus 
( ) 
for ideas, opinions M 
 
W 
7 
 
9 
6 
 
4 
67 
 
69 
20 
 
18 
100 (1533) 
100 (1533) 
 
.47** 
for the friends you see, your 
outings 
M 
 
W 
5 
 
7 
8 
 
5 
69 
 
70 
18 
 
18 
100 (1534) 
100 (1534) 
 
.35** 
for your finances M 
 
W 
30 
 
45 
6 
 
3 
47 
 
38 
17 
 
14 
100 (1534) 
100 (1532) 
 
.57** 
for your emotional equili-
brium 
M 
 
W 
5 
 
8 
10 
 
6 
46 
 
47 
39 
 
39 
100 (1532) 
100 (1529) 
 
.24** 
for your social status, your 
social ranking 
M 
 
W 
9 
 
9 
2 
 
1 
70 
 
72 
19 
 
17 
100 (1527) 
100 (1521) 
 
.41** 
for doing the household 
chores and bringing up the 
children (if there are any) 
M 
 
W 
4 
 
5 
45 
 
44 
33 
 
35 
18 
 
16 
100 (1530) 
100 (1528) 
 
.31** 
So we find a generalized picture of (declared) equilibrium by independence or interde-
pendence between the partners. However, two significant exceptions appear; they con-
cern the two instrumental items of housework and finances where the answer dis-
tributions are skewed towards the traditional model: men tend to depend on their fe-
male partners for housework (more so according to themselves than according to their 
wives), and women tend to depend financially on their male partners. If we combine 
these two aspects, one third of the couples declared symmetry in both areas (no unila-
teral dependence), a fifth sees the man depend for family work, but not the woman fi-
nancially, another fifth sees inversely the woman depend financially but not the man 
for housework, and a fourth declares complementary dependence, in conformity with 
the traditional model. 
We do not have detailed normative questions at our disposal that explicitly refer to the 
power distribution ; such questions, implying open acceptance or rejection of male do-
minance or privilege (e.g., «  When the man returns from work, he has to be able to get 
a rest, whatever the problems in the household may be « , or «  A certain equality in 
marriage may be all right, but in family matters, the man should have the casting voice 
« ) were included in the 1971 survey, where they yielded distributions that did not seem 
ideologically biased. Thirty years later, in our 1998 survey, we found it impossible to 
use such items as they were too openly sexist to be accepted even by people who would 
personally agree with them. We nevertheless included an overall question about who 
should be the boss in the family. About two thirds of the respondents prefer the no-boss 
or equality answer, one fifth prefers the man, and less than a tenth (7.9% of the men and 
14 
4.2% of the women) the woman. Two thirds of the couples completely agree in their 
answers (  = .32). Again, almost all of those who don’t, do not give contradictory an-
swers (only 2.7% of the couples), but one partner gives an equality answer while the 
other does assign the boss position (with two thirds of these couples assigning it to the 
man, one third to the woman). When compared to the couples’ description of their ac-
tual situation, the answer distributions of the normative variant are identical for cou-
ples saying they have no boss and those who identify the man as the boss: practically all 
(98% and 97%) prefer equality and only 2% the man. In the rare couples who identify 
the wife as the actual boss, the normative opinion that the man should have this role ris-
es to 37%, which may appear as an expression of uneasiness with the actual situation; in 
the very small category of couples with directly opposite descriptions of who is actually 
the boss, possibly expressing something like a competitive power situation, this per-
centage is even higher (48%). Thus, in situations that do not correspond to the tradition-
al model, the man appears as a desirable boss to a substantial part of respondents while 
in the other situations, both partners prefer equality, whether the traditional model of 
male dominance is admitted or equality is declared. This may be interpreted in at least 
two ways. Either the norm of equality is strong and practically realized in the couples 
who recognize they have a (male) boss, or the man holds de facto the same dominant 
position in the two cases, but for normative reasons, part of those couples prefer to de-
clare the situation as equality. A third interpretation could be in terms of a couple’s pri-
vate, subcultural definition of actual inequality as corresponding to its norms of equity 
and thus « equal », at variance to what it seems from the outside. Probably, only quali-
tative probing could give unequivocal clues to these competing interpretations’ ade-
quacy. 
We shall not try to decide that question here, but stick to more straightforward conclu-
sions. Our findings on task attribution and decisional power show that the coincidence 
between norms and practice in this subject matter is not given by itself. There is some 
evidence confirming the persistence of a considerable amount of normative acceptance 
of male dominance, but, even more importantly, the norm of equality seems to have 
been accepted much more generally than actual equality in contemporary Swiss cou-
ples. 
 
4. Working outside the family: gendered employment participation 
4.1 Who is in the labor market ? 
The traditional model of family organization, based on sexual task segregation, ruled 
out female occupation even though at all times a substantial, but variable and some-
times minor part of married women did not stay entirely out of the labor market (not to 
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mention unmarried women). The quite inequitable complementarity between a wife 
looking after the internal affairs of the family and a husband assuring its survival by 
earning the necessary income outside was culturally – and for a long time also sociolog-
ically – defined as balanced (Held 1978). While this part of the traditional model is no 
longer generally dominant, neither on the level of norms nor on that of practical action, 
it has far from turned into its opposite, except for a specific set of countries. According 
to Maruani’s (1993) comparative analyses, Switzerland, like (West) Germany, belongs to 
the group of countries where employment goes currently along with marriage, but not 
with motherhood. Let us first look into the question of female labor-force participation 
in a static perspective and then bring in its variation through the life course. 
The labor-force participation of men and women living in couples follows quite dif-
ferent patterns. Whereas very few men do not work full-time before they are retired, 
women work in relatively equal proportions on all levels of involvement: not em-
ployed, employed at less than 50%, 50%-89%, and full-time (i.e., 90%-100%). If we com-
bine these four categories for men and women living together, we find, significantly, in 
the ensuing 16-cell table all of women's participation degrees with sizeable frequencies 
if the man is working full-time, but the eleven cells with the man working less than full-
time, taken together (under the heading « atypical ») except for retirees, sum up to 
hardly more than the weakest single cell frequency of the more « typical » situations 
(13% as against 11% - 27%). Thus, in table 4, the 11 atypical cells have been collapsed 
into one.xxii 
Given this background information, it is safe to say that in Switzerland, the occupatio-
nal participation of men living in couples follows quite extensively a binary model of 
employment : it is either full-time or none at all, as opposed to women's occupational 
participation which is « flexible » and shows a large variability. This picture testifies to 
an enduring strength of the male breadwinner model ; men who live in a couple and 
have finished their initial education work full-time until retirement except in cases of 
accidents like forced unemployment.xxiii  
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Table 4 : Partners' combined rates of employment (%) 
 
Partners' employment configuration Couples (%) 
neither employed (both 0%) 12 
man full-time, woman not employed (M 100%, W 0%) 27 
man full-time, woman less than 50% (M 100%, W < 50%) 20 
man full-time, woman 50 - 89% (M 100%, W > 50%) 17 
both full-time (M 100%, W 100%) 11 
atypical situations (man less than full-time) (M<W) 13 
Total (N) 100 (1534) 
Thus, women's activities are much less exclusively confined to the family than the Par-
sons-Bales (or historical bourgeois) model would have it. There seems to be considera-
ble room for women’s employment while they live in couples. Nevertheless, our com-
parisons of men's and women's employment ratios and also of their contributions to the 
household income show that except for the atypical cases, the women’s contributions 
remain supplementary to the men’s income: in no more than 10.6% of our couples does 
the female income equal or even exceed the male one, and more than half of these cou-
ples are in the atypical situation as the man is less than full-time employed.xxiv A telling 
expression of the subsidiary status of most women's income is the median value which 
amounts to 5477 Swiss franks for the men and 1201 franks for the women (ratio 4.6 : 1, 
which of course should not suggest that in a substantial number of couples, the wo-
man’s income is not vital for the household).  
A more systematic appreciation of this interpretation can be made by comparing the 
correlations between the partners’ individual incomes and their common household 
income (graph 1), for which they tend to give extremely similar estimates (  = .85).xxv 
The household income correlates highly with the man’s individual income, much less 
with the woman’s whose contribution appears, thus, to be less determining for the 
overall common income than the man’s. The two individual incomes are independent 
of each other, suggesting that a probable tendency to compensation of one income by 
the other is overridden by the occupational corollaries of homogamy.xxvi 
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Graph 1 Correlations ( ) between partners’ individual and household incomes  
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In the sense of our general question we can bring home the result that employment is 
clearly no longer in a fundamental contradiction with the status of the woman as a part-
ner in a couple, but her contribution to the family’s finances remains subsidiary in a 
great majority of cases, whereas the male partner still appears as the major economic 
provider of the household. In this sense, we can indeed conclude that the male-bread-
winner model has not died, at least not (yet) in Switzerland. 
What about norms concerning this question? Our questionnaire allows us to confront 
the actual picture with a roughly corresponding norm formulated as follows: « In case 
your everyday life should be seriously disturbed - like having to move your household, 
a serious illness, or an important problem in your kinship - who of you two would 
change durably his or her duties, time-table or projects in order to maintain your com-
mon life in the new situation? » This question is supposed to tap the partners' norms 
about the dominant status area – employment or family - in a more general way than 
just referring to the presence of children: for whom are the family duties considered to 
be dominant, for whom the occupational duties? Again, the partners in the interviewed 
couples agree quite largely and in most cases in a sex-typed sense : 61% say it would be 
the woman, 12% the man, and 27% that it is not clear from the outset, that it would de-
pend, or that it could be both or either of them. How does this norm relate to the part-
ners’ actual employment situation? 
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Table 5 :  Who would adapt his/her occupational enrolment in order to cope with ur-
gent family needs, by effective rates of employment (%, women’s answers) 
 
Who would change ? 
 
Couple's rates of employment  all 
(women’s' answers) both 
0%xxvii 
M 100% 
W 0% 
M 100% 
W < 50% 
M 100% 
W ≥ 50% 
M 100% 
W 100% M < W
xxviii couples 
he 3 8 7 8 8 11 8 
she 36 54 61 54 31 42 49 
both 56 34 30 33 52 43 39 
depends, don't know 5 4 2 5 9 4 5 
Total 
(N) 
100% 
(185) 
100% 
(414) 
100% 
(306) 
100% 
(263) 
100% 
(171) 
100% 
(198) 
100% 
(1534) 
Table 5 shows that on this normative level, the adjustment of the employment to the 
family needs is considered to be the woman's duty in a third to more than half of all the 
couples, the man's in hardly 10% of them; another third to half of them do not distin-
guish between the partners. xxix Whether it ought to be the woman is related to quite 
some degree – although not linearly - to her actual rate of employment, with a « low » 
31% in couples where both partners are employed full-time, and over 50% in the other 
situations (except for the retiree couples and the atypically employed ones where part 
of the men are already retired). The correlation is significant and confirms a direct in-
verse relationship between the rate of occupational engagement and the (normative) 
availability for family urgencies, but considered overall, it is of only moderate strength 
(Cramer’s V = .14 for women’s answers, .16 for men’s). On closer scrutiny, the table re-
veals interesting partial relationships. The normative availability of men is very low, 
but it is slightly increased in atypical employment constellations when the man is occu-
pied less than full-time. The normative availability of the woman decreases with her 
increasing degree of employment, beginning with low-rate part-time occupation. One 
might say that to the extent that the weight of her employment increases, her exclusive 
availability decreases and the « both » answer becomes more acceptable. In parallel, but 
on a much lower level, the « don’t know » and « it depends » answers increase also. The 
fact that couples with full-time employed men and with women employed in a 
« small » part-time job (under 50%) have the most traditional answer distribution, even 
more so than couples with a complete segregation, is also interesting as it coincides 
with some other findings showing that small-rate female employment has no reducing 
effect on traditional forms of regulation. It may well be that this employment constella-
tion expresses an especially strained compromise between both highly valued family 
activities and equally highly valued or necessary employment activities – this interpre-
tation needs more refined analyses than have been conducted so far. 
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To sum up our findings concerning the normative priority of employment vs. the fa-
mily, we can conclude that there is interdependence between the actual, objectively de-
fined employment situation of the couple and the normative dominance of the family 
for the woman, but other factors must be of similar or higher importance, given the ra-
ther modest correlation we found. Only in couples with identical enrolment rates of the 
partners (both 0% or both 100%) the non-typed answers amount to a small majority. 
In order to enlarge somewhat the horizon of the analysis, let us add an assessment of 
traditional male-female complementarity, based on the two instrumental items of our 
question about (inter-) dependence. This complementary aspect is more internal than 
the actual employment and expresses a subjective perception to a higher degree (table 
6). 
Table 6:  Who would adjust his or her occupational enrolment in order to cope with 
urgent family needs, by instrumental interdependence (%, women’s an-
swers) 
 
 
Who would 
change? 
 
Instrumental interdependence 
(women’s' answers) indepen-
dent 
she depends on 
him (finances) 
he depends on 
her (house-
hold) 
complementary 
dependence 
he 7 6 8 7 
she 34 47 53 59 
both 52 41 34 32 
depends, don't kn. 7 6 5 3 
total (N) 100% (354) 100% (322) 100% (191) 100% (520) 
The main result of table 6 is a correlation in the sense that the more instrumental inter-
dependence there is according to the traditional model, the higher the proportion of 
couples where the adjustment to family needs at the expense of gainful employment is 
considered to be the wife's duty.xxx This norm seems then to be quite logically related to 
the traditional model of family organization. Here again, however, the correlation is 
significant, but moderately so, which can be interpreted as meaning that this norm is to 
a considerable extent autonomous, independent of situative elements. 
Without going into the examination of other possible influence factors, let us conclude 
that there is some significant correspondence between the actual situation of employ-
ment and the acceptance of the normative principle that the family ought to be the do-
minant responsibility of the wife, but that another part of this norm seems to be either 
autonomous or related to other factors not identified yet. 
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4.2 How are men’s and women’s working hours related? 
Let us come back to the factual level and examine to what extent the employment con-
figuration influences the effective family-work load of the woman. Table 7 has been es-
tablished using an estimation of women’s relative share of family-work hours; it shows 
quite a strong relationship (Cramer’s V = .30). 
Table 7 Women's estimated share of total family-work hours, by rates of employ-
ment 
 
Women's part of 
Couple's rates of employment 
 all 
family-work hours both 0% M 100% W 0% 
M 100% 
W < 50% 
M 100% 
W ≥ 50% 
M 100% 
W 100% M < W 
couples 
up to 40% 4 3 3 8 20 14 7 
40% - 60% 22 14 20 28 24 31 22 
60-80% 41 47 42 41 41 32 42 
80-100% 34 36 36 24 15 23 30 
Total 
(N) 
100% 
(184) 
100% 
(409) 
100% 
(304) 
100% 
(261) 
100% 
(170) 
100% 
(195) 
100% 
(1523) 
We look first at the four situations with full-time employed men. There is an overall re-
lationship in the sense that with an increasing female employment rate, the man's fa-
mily-work engagement increases and the woman's decreases, except for rates below 
50% that seem to make no difference compared to no female employment at all. How-
ever, couples with a substantial male share of family work remain rare even in the atyp-
ical situation where the men's employment intensity is less than full-time and often 
lower than their female partner’s. We note moreover that retiree households show a 
work distribution similar to that of couples with an entirely traditional, segregated em-
ployment situation. In all situations, these variations notwithstanding, the woman bears 
the major part of family work (over 60%) in a majority of the couples.  
In more technical terms, with men’s employment rates controlled, we find a substantial 
negative relationship between women’s employment rates and their share of family 
work. But this is only part of the possible interrelationships to which we finally turn. 
How are employment hours and family-work hours related to each other for men and 
women? We do have approximate information on both partners’ working hours in both 
areas, in terms of employment rates and weekly hours spent for family work. To give a 
quick overview, graph 2 presents the zero-order intercorrelations of the four indicators. 
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Graph 2 Correlations ( ) between men’s and women’s occupational and family 
work engagement, based on weekly work hours 
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The intercorrelations show an asymmetric pattern of interconnections. The strongest 
correlation is the negative one between women’s family and occupational engagement, 
indicating the presence of an either-or situation. Elimination of couples with retired 
partners reinforces this correlation. The moderate correlation between male and female 
employment rates cannot be interpreted in general terms because the male employment 
rate, unlike the other three variables, has shown to be mainly binary. The correlations 
implying this measure are largely constituted by the comparison between full-time em-
ployed and retired men,xxxi which makes them somewhat trivial: the correlation men-
tioned mainly says that women living with non-retired men tend to have higher em-
ployment rates than the others, which could be a simple age effect because most wives 
of retired men are retired themselves. Without retired couples, this correlation inverses 
its sign and becomes negative, showing a complementary relationship between non-
retired partners’ employment rates, i.e., some tendency toward a compensatory link, 
underlining the fact that to some degree, the partners’ household unit functions also as 
an economic unit. The other two non-zero correlations are relatively weak. Female part-
ners of employed men have a slightly greater load of family work than those of retired 
men, probably taking up part of the housework that could be done by the man were he 
not (or less) employed, which is interesting in that one could imagine a negative corre-
lation meaning that non-employed (retired) men take up more family work than em-
ployed ones (this correlation is not influenced by retirement, .23 instead of .22). Female 
and male family work is somewhat positively correlated, possibly indicating a weak 
« solidarity » effect probably related to the total amount of family work needed (again, 
we find no retirement effect : .21 instead of .22). Including and excluding retired cou-
ples, the correlation between male family work and female employment rates remains 
zero (.05 with and .06 without retired), expressing what we could subsume from earlier 
results, i.e., that men’s high employment rate and low family-work rate vary insignifi-
cantly, to the contrary of women’s, and consequently do not « respond » to women’s 
rates’ variations. The last correlation, between men’s occupational and family work, 
becomes reasonably negative (-.24) instead of zero (-.06) if only non-retired men are 
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considered, indicating a slight tendency towards an either-or use of time, although with 
a coefficient that remains considerably more moderate than its female counterpart. 
The whole situation strongly suggests the interpretation that when problems about the 
distribution of work time appear in the couple, the real zero-sum game about time use 
is on the side of the women, between their employment and their family work ; the va-
riability of men’s occupational and family hours is weak, with a heavy preponderance 
of their occupational hours.xxxii There is no systematic relationship between men’s fami-
ly-work hours and women’s occupational hours, i.e., men’s family-work engagement 
does not lead to or allow higher female employment rates, nor is the former condi-
tioned by the latter, and there is no systematic overall relationship between men’s em-
ployment and the amount of their family work either (but a clear hint at a weak rela-
tionship when full-time and less-than-full-time employed men are being compared) 
while women’s family-work hours do have an « alleviating » relationship with men’s – 
and with men’s employment rate.xxxiii 
To put it briefly, this first part of our exploration has shown that many women living in 
a couple today participate in the labor market and that tendencially, the partners’ share 
of family work varies with the intensity of women's employment according to a com-
pensatory logic (whereas men’s does not vary). Even so, it clearly appears that women’s 
primary attachment remains, in a large majority of the couples, to the family and not to 
their employment, on both the factual and the normative level, and that the high, but 
variable female share of family work seems to be a condition for men’s high and steady 
occupational involvement. To put it squarely: when it comes to real hours of performed 
work and to real money earned on the labor market, there is a strong tendency for men 
to remain the main breadwinners, and for women to remain the main family workers. 
 
5. Gendered participation profiles and phases of family life 
5.1 Towards a « structural » concept of family phases 
After this structural and static analysis, let us add a more dynamic perspective although 
the synchronic data at hand impose an indirect approach that we call « meta-static ». 
This needs an introductory discussion. We can compare our responding couples by 
means of some simple information pertaining to the classical phases of family life, usu-
ally referred to in terms of the family life cycle, which correspond to the usual opera-
tionalization of this concept in sociology and social demography (Murphy 1987). We 
can distinguish five such phases and compare them with couples who have no children 
and will not have, according to statistical likelihood and personal projects.xxxiv This « life 
course » variable allows us to compare groups of couples in specific phases of the typi-
cal family trajectory, but cannot tell us beyond doubt whether any one couple passing 
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from one phase to the next will change or remain stable exactly according to the results 
of our comparison because we cannot follow them up. Several results give a strong 
credibility to a life-course interpretation of findings such as those in this section. First, 
the relatively concentrated age distributions within each of the five family phases and 
their differences between the phases support the interpretation of these phases in terms 
of a temporal succession. Second, most of our analyses that relate a family or participa-
tional variable both to age and to this life cycle variable produce more distinctive results 
with the latter than with the former. This is most clearly the case for the female em-
ployment patterns. This points to the fact that even if time is implied, the crux is less the 
personal age or the couple’s duration than the « structural » phase of family life as it is 
usually defined, i.e., the absence or presence of children and their situation in terms of 
schooling. Third, a relationship between female work load and family phase is more 
readily interpretable as an influence of the latter on the former than in the opposite 
sense since it is hard to see how a given work load could influence the phase in which 
the family actually is.  
Before looking at the partners' rates of employment in this meta-static life course per-
spective, it may be important to stress the « structural » aspect of the family phases. As 
this second remark underlines, we may not take the family phases to just represent time 
in an abstract sense. As they are usually defined, they represent different constellations 
with which the couple has to cope, depending mainly on the presence of children and 
their extra-familial career with respect to school and occupation. Without necessarily 
taking up the perspective of developmental family tasks (Duvall 1957), we have to take 
into account the many feedbacks on internal family dynamics, and thus the parents’ 
everyday situation, provoked not only by the individual development, but also (or even 
more so) by the extrafamilial institutional career of the children. In this perspective, a 
life-course or family-life-cycle interpretation of differences between the phases of the 
family life must not necessarily assume that any individual person living in a given 
phase has reached this phase by the simple succession implied for the whole group. To 
illustrate this idea by an arbitrarily constructed example, take one mother grown-up 
children living in their own household, who has been living as a single for some years 
and rooms in with a man himself separated from another woman but with the custody 
of their pre-school twins. Her life course is all but linear: in terms of the classical succes-
sion of family phases she comes back to an earlier phase after having left a later family 
situation, but these precedents notwithstanding, there are good chances that she will 
find herself involved in the situational logic that corresponds to the classical phase of a 
family with pre-school children. In that sense, the family phases should rather be con-
sidered as structural configurations « normally » succeeding each other in a given or-
der, but mainly defined by specific social situations, and not as a mere « timing of 
events » in individual life courses (Levy 1996, Giele & Elder 1998). 
24 
5.2 Explorative analysis of the impact of family phases 
Graph 3 shows that the employment pattern of women, contrary to that of men, is clear-
ly related to the phases of family life as we define them. This relationship is even more 
pronounced if the employment rates are weighted by the activity rates (not shown in 
the graph, but see table 8), with again no such relation for men. The arrival of a child is 
the main reason for the interruption of female employment; a later return to em-
ployment remains below the initial level (which is only slightly higher than that of cou-
ples without children: 70.7% for the women, 79.3% for the men – while this category 
contains a large range of ages, including retired persons).xxxv 
Graph 3: Women's and men's employment rates (% employed), by phases of family life 
 
0
20
40
60
80
100
pre-
child
pre-
school
school post-
school
post-
child
%
men
women
 
Since table 7 demonstrated the relationship between the couples' employment configu-
rations and the women's share of family work, it is interesting to check whether there is 
a relationship between these configurations and the family phases. In accordance with 
graph 3, table 8 confirms that it is women's, not men’s paid employment which is 
strongly related to the typical phases of family life. After the birth of the first child, al-
most half of the women quit their employment altogether and another third reduce 
their occupational time investment. The proportion of couples with continuing « double 
careers » (which are in fact often nothing more than a double full-time employment 
without any career perspectives for the woman or both partners) drops dramatically 
and lastingly between the pre-child phase and the preschool-child phase while the pro-
portion of traditionally segregated couples (man full-time, woman not employed) in-
creases to almost half of all couples, to drop again in later phases where there is some 
tendency to resume or to increase again women's paid employment (but to a rather lim-
ited extent). Let us insist once again that these rather strong family-bound variations 
hold for women whereas nothing of the sort can be observed for men.xxxvi 
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Table 8 : Partners' employment rates (%) and phases of family life 
 
Partners’  Phases of couple- and family life couples  
employment con-
figuration 
pre-child 
 
pre-school  school  post-
school  
post-child  without 
children 
both 0% 1 2 1 10 41 18 
M 100%, W 0% 8 47 31 24 20 25 
M 100%, W < 50% 4 22 35 26 9 2 
M 100%, W ≥ 50% 26 15 18 22 9 22 
both100% 46 4 8 9 2 10 
M < W 16 10 8 8 18 22 
Total (N) 100 (187) 100 (302) 100 (400) 100 (227) 100 (319) 100 (49) 
N = 1484, Cramer's V = .33** 
« Another side » of this relationship is confirmed by graph 4 that shows the association 
between family work hours and family phases for men and women. The median num-
ber of weekly hours rises in the presence of a small child and diminishes slowly in sub-
sequent phases. The differential between female and male investment into family work 
remains consistent and substantial in all five phases. By visual inspection of the graph, 
we might not say that male investment in family work depends less on the « needs » of 
family life, but statistically speaking, the relationship is clearly stronger for women 
(Cramer’s V = .39) than for men (V = .21). Moreover, male investment remains inferior 
to female investment by ratios that rise considerably across the phases, from 2.2 to 4.9 
(or 4.4 for the last phase).xxxvii Let us add that the age differences between adjacent phas-
es as well as the correlation of family-work hours with age are both too small to account 
for a substantial part of the relationship in graph 4. 
Graph 4 Women's and men’s median hours of family work per week and fe-
male/male ratios (right-hand axis), by phases of family life 
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A second « other» or rather a complementary side to the flexibility of women’s employ-
ment rate as a function of the family phases is its obverse: the relationship of the men’s 
family work hours as a function of their employment rate which we examined more 
globally in graph 2. We need no table to examine this relationship: the slight variations 
we find do not constitute a clearly interpretable association, even though it is significant 
(Cramer’s V = .07**). Men’s median weekly hours are practically the same for retirees 
(10.3) as for full-time employed (9.8) but higher (13.2) for the rare cases that are less 
than full-time employed. 
 
5.3 Regression analysis of family phase effects 
Although the main thrust of this paper is explorative, as we explained at the outset, we 
add a set of ordinary least squares regressions in order to quantify the effects of the 
family phases on the distribution of domestic work (female share) and on women’s em-
ployment rate, controlling the confounding effects of other variables (table 9). Model A 
considers the effects of family phases without any control variables. It shows that all 
family phases have a significant effect in making the women's share bigger than in the 
prechild phase (taken as the reference category). When age and educational level of 
women as well as monthly income and employment rates of their male partners are in-
cluded (Model B), the successive family phases still make the women's share signifi-
cantly bigger than in the prechild family. Only in families where the children have left 
the parental household (post-child phase) or in couples without any children do we 
find no difference in the women's share of domestic work compared with couples in the 
prechild phase. Among the supplementary variables, both the woman’s age and her 
male partner’s involvement in the labor market have independent strengthening effects 
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on the unequal distribution of family work whereas the woman’s educational level 
slightly redresses the gender balance. Age net of family phases, in this context, may 
well be a proxy for generational differences; the male partner’s occupational involve-
ment expresses mainly the distinction between employed and retired men, as we have 
already argued. Thus our interpretation that family phases have an important influence 
on the organization of domestic tasks in families, net of possibly confounding variables 
among which the woman’s age is most prominent, is corroborated by these models. It is 
interesting to note, however, that inclusion of women's employment rate as an inde-
pendent variable (Model C) makes the effect of the family phases vanish. This suggests 
that family phases may be strongly correlated with women's employment rate and that 
this correlation is to a large extent responsible for their effect on organization of domes-
tic tasks. Models D and E address this issue. 
 
Table 9 Phases of family life as predictors of women’s share of domestic work and 
women’s employment rate (standardized coefficients (beta)) 
 
 Women's share of domestic work Women's employment rate 
Independent variables Model A Model B Model C Model D Model E 
prechild couple (ref. cat.) - - - - - 
preschool family .229** .176** .033 -.597** -.507** 
school aged family .279** .158** .064 -.553** -.339** 
post-school aged family .292** .134** .106 -.412** -.099* 
post-child family .317** .119 .079 -.659** -.146* 
couples with no child .031 -.046 -.035* -.13** .036 
      
woman’s age - .225** .106 - -.423** 
woman’s educational level  - -.087** -.058* - .102** 
man’s monthly income - .060* .026 - -.12** 
man’s employment rate  - .123** .140** - .058 
woman’s employment 
rate  
- - -.281** - - 
R2 .06 .09 .14 .21 .27 
F 17.55** 14.32** 23.03** 74.4** 58.7** 
* p < .05,  **p < .01 
As shown in Models D and E, the pattern of influence found in Models A and B has its 
equivalent on the side of employment: the women's employment rates also depend 
strongly on the family phases, even more so than their family-work share, as the higher 
R2 indicate. Even when age and other control variables are included (Model E), family 
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phases still retain a strong influence on women's employment rates. Especially phases 
with a dependent child (preschool- and school-child families in particular) are associat-
ed with much lower female employment rates than other phases, as graph 3 already 
showed. Post-child families and no-child couples present employment rates much clos-
er to those of prechild families. These results suggest that for women, employment rates 
and share of domestic tasks are systemically interrelated, both following the logic of 
family phases that typically represent different amounts of work. The burden repre-
sented by children strongly influences both the women's share of family work and, 
thus, their engagement in paid work. When this burden decreases (as the family enters 
a phase where children get more independent), women can get more involved in occu-
pational activities and therefore increase their involvement in paid employment. The 
difference of the R2 between the two dependent variables – higher for employment rate 
than for family-work share - suggests that the effect of the family phases on the distri-
bution of family work might be mediated by the women’s employment rate. This is cor-
roborated by Model C that adds the female employment rate to Model B: in Model C, 
the women’s employment rate “takes over” the significant parts of the family phase 
effects on family-work share while it is itself quite well explained by the family phases 
(Models D and E). 
What about men? Are their employment rates also sensitive to family phases and do 
they remain so when control variables are included? Table 10 answers these questions. 
 
Table 10 Phases of family life as predictors of men's employment rate (standardized 
coefficients (Beta)) 
 Men's employment rate 
 Model A Model B 
prechild couple (reference category) - - 
preschool family .022 .132** 
school aged family .037 .349** 
post-school aged family -.074* .403** 
post-child family -.504** .304** 
couples with no child -.086* .181* 
   
man’s age  - -.772** 
man’s educational level  - .063** 
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woman’s monthly income  - -.053 
woman’s employment rate  - .061 
R2 .26 .43 
F 100.15** 118.7 
* p < .05,  **p<.01 
Model A shows that family phases characterized by the presence of children do not 
have any effect on men's employment rates: contrary to their effect on women, they do 
not promote a lower implication of men in occupational activity. Only when children 
have left the parental home do we find a significant effect: the employment rates of men 
decrease, in sharp contrast with what we found for women. This effect is likely to be 
associated with age, as men usually reach their age of retirement in this phase of family 
life. 
The inclusion of control variables (Model B)xxxviii has a very different effect for men than 
for women: the effects of all family phases become highly significant and, unlike for 
women, positive. This means that when a control of age is set (which has, as the table 
shows, a much bigger influence on men's employment rates than on women's), the fam-
ily phases after the prechild phase increase men’s employment rates (it is interesting to 
note that the effect of the post-child phase decreases with the introduction of age, con-
firming that this effect is more age-related than phase-related). Thus, the logic of men's 
and women's professional trajectories appears to be opposite. Family phases with de-
pendent children decrease the women's employment rates and increase the men's em-
ployment rates. Only couples without children do not follow this logic, as shown by the 
insignificance of this phase for women and its marginal significance for men.  
Putting all our results together, we can conclude that there is a strong relationship – 
which we can interpret as an influence on the basis of the arguments developed at the 
beginning of this section and our quantitative findings - between the family phases and 
women’s employment, and next to no relationships with or influence on men’s em-
ployment.xxxix We find a strong exclusionary relationship between women’s employ-
ment rate and their family-work load – the time spent for work at home cannot be spent 
for work in an occupation, and vice-versa; but none for men. And we find practically no 
relationship between men’s employment rates and their investment in family-work.xl 
This can be reformulated in the sense that if a strict sexual segregation of activities 
along the internal/external (or private/public) divide, typical of the traditional model 
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of family organization, has become rare, nevertheless a complementary relationship 
between male and female participation profiles emerges on a rather large range: the 
family tasks prevail for women and limit their occupational participation, the occupa-
tional tasks prevail for men and limit their family participation. As the load of women’s 
family tasks varies with the phases of family life, women’s occupational participation 
varies as well, but more or less to the extent that their family obligations allow. As 
men’s employment rates vary only slightly, their family investment is also relatively 
constant, but it seems even more constant than it should be for that reason only. This is 
highlighted by the fact that retired men do hardly more family work than fully em-
ployed men – sheer availability seems of no relevance here. To use an economic con-
cept: women’s employment rates have a rather high family-task elasticity whereas 
men’s family-work rates are employment-inelastic. Plain availability does not seem to 
account for these findings. Rather, the reason for this fact is likely to be found in the low 
social valuation of family work, especially for men – or put differently, in the lasting 
sex-typing of these activities under changed circumstances which this paper docu-
ments. 
In order to develop a fuller interpretation of our results, we can take up a term inspired 
by an article of Hughes (1945), master status, sometimes used by feminist scholars but in 
a modified sense. In accordance with Hughes’ argumentation, sex itself is usually consi-
dered to be a master status, in the sense that it outweighs other status criteria and cre-
ates tensions when it is not in accordance with the cultural definition of inferiority or 
superiority of other status criteria (Laws 1979). The concept is mainly used with refer-
ence to identity; this may be the reason why it seems to be used more often in the social-
psychological than in the sociological literature (e.g., Ferree & Smith 1979). In the con-
text of our analysis, it appears to be more promising to use this concept in a more com-
plex way, i.e. to define master status as meaning the (socially determined) dominance of 
one status area over the others in an individual’s participation profile, and to apply this 
definition to the complementarity of sex-specific master-statuses of the partners in a 
couple. We leave open, for the time being, the question of the reasons responsible for 
this dominance, but then at the same time underline its importance. Our findings point 
exactly in this direction : 
  the female master status area is the family, employment is subsidiary to it ;  
  the male master status area is employment, the family is subsidiary to it ; 
  together, they form a complementary system that can exist in several variants, the 
traditional model being just one extreme case where each partner’s sex-specifically 
dominant status area excludes the other one ; in most empirical cases today the 
dominance of one field is less exclusive and moreover, its expression varies across 
the family phases. This does not mean however that is has entirely disappeared. 
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So we come to the conclusion that the sexist gender order in the family has become flex-
ible, but that it remains largely alive in a modernized form. 
 
6. Conclusion: family traditionalism is not dead, it is rather being modernized 
Our exploration of recent Swiss data on couples and their internal organization has 
produced convergent evidence in accordance with many results of other studies from 
different countries (see once more the detailed literature overviews by Shelton & John 
1996, Shelton 1999, Bielby 1999, or Coltrane 2000) ; for our purpose, it can be summa-
rized in the following way : 
1. In a synchronic perspective, different types of (internal) family regulation vary con-
siderably, especially the dimension of task inequality between women and men, 
whereas their general change over the last thirty years seems relatively moderate. 
No single type predominates, neither the fully traditional one which still exists, nor 
any opposite or inverse type. The main departure from the traditional model is the 
more widespread employment of non-single women, much more than certain trends 
towards less inequality in the family. 
2. We find a strong asymmetry concerning the partners’ patterns of handling the pa-
rallelism of family and employment obligations. Male participation profiles are 
mainly organized around employment that remains, to a very large extent, fixed on 
full-time enrolment, leaving only little room for family duties. Female participation 
profiles pivot around the family. They entail work loads that vary strongly between 
typical phases of family life and affect women’s employment while men’s remains 
unaffected. 
3. Thus, according to our evidence, the male breadwinner model has much less dis-
appeared than folk and media wisdom would have it and than statistical data on 
male and female employment seem to reveal (if not longitudinal and properly dif-
ferentiated). It has, however, changed its appearance : men’s employment careers 
are steady and tendencially ascending, women’s careers are broken and static or de-
scending.xli 
4. The overall result is that only a minority of women living in couples stay perma-
nently out of the field of employment (but still about one third), others attune their 
occupational life to lesser and not necessarily constant extents to the family life cy-
cle, which itself varies according to a calendar or agenda that is largely set by extra-
familial institutions. 
Once a child has arrived, the calendar of family life is in fact largely determined by the 
social institutionalization of children’s upbringing, to the point that their school career 
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has traditionally been used to define the phases of the family life cycle. This implies that 
individual couples have a limited leeway to influence the conditions under which the 
tasks and work loads typical of each phase can be honored. This gives to the institu-
tional environment a considerable influence on a couple’s choices of internal organiza-
tion. This influence is likely to be affected again by social-political measures. If we 
found many signs of wide-spread normative egalitarianism among our respondents, it 
appears that this belongs more to the area of generalized beliefs and opinions than to 
personal convictions that would be strong enough to motivate decisions going against 
choices that are generally considered to be rational (like renouncing to parts of employ-
ment that induce greater losses of income – usually the man’s - for the sake of gender 
equality in the couple). It would be interesting to enlarge our questioning to the condi-
tions and consequences of this situation. Let us just mention the beginning comparative 
research literature on the influence of the institutional framework in various societies 
on the rules relevant for the couples’ choices concerning the partners’ employment. 
These comparisons are working with adapted typologies of regimes of social policy 
(Pfau-Effinger 1999, Künzler & Walter 1999, Korpi 2000, Boje & Almqvist 2000, Fux & 
Baumgartner 2001). Their interesting results show that the Swiss situation, that has been 
our focus, belongs to an especially « liberal », i.e., non-interventionist and de facto ine-
quality-fostering regime otherwise typical of the Anglo-Saxon countries. 
This makes us think that the modernization of family traditionalism which we have 
found instead of a simple disappearance of the traditional model, expresses a resilience 
of traditional elements that may be due to a large extent to the extrafamilial context of 
living and its ways of functioning. In this perspective, a considerable part of the family 
structure appears to be institutionalized indirectly by exogenous social rhythms and 
structures as much as or even more than by the personal beliefs and interpersonal nego-
tiations of individual partners. This gives some credibility to the institutional rather 
than to the autopoïetic, constructivist, or resource-theoretical interpretations, without 
contradicting complementary elements of utility-optimization or of inter-individual 
« doing gender ».xlii 
In this context, let us come back to the concept of master status. As already pointed out, 
the actual use of the concept in the literature is strongly limited to cultural mechanisms 
like sex-specific prestige differentials, sex-role expectations and possibly gender per-
formance (« doing gender ») and their inter-individual enactment (although the doing-
gender literature hardly refers to that term). With respect to the interconnections be-
tween the different (gendered) ways of combining or not combining family work and 
occupational work and the (equally gendered) life course, Krüger & Levy (2001) have 
discussed the necessity not to focus the problematic of doing gender preferentially or 
even exclusively on the inter-individual, micro-social level, as the initial ethnomethodo-
logical orientation of this concept did, but to apply it to the sometimes macro- but more 
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frequently meso-social, institutional level as well. Institutions in the sense of organiza-
tions, and not only « moral » or cultural institutions or ideologies, are doing gender as 
well as or even more effectively than individual actors, and a gendered functioning of 
the institutional environment where a couple lives may create strong incentives to ac-
cept sex-specific master-statuses even if the partners have other, e.g., egalitarian, nor-
mative convictions.xliii 
At the end, a methodological consequence of our findings should also be pointed out. 
The introduction of a typology of family-life configurations or phases has not only ad-
ded strong evidence to our substantial conclusion. It makes it plain that unlike for men, 
strictly synchronic data about women’s participation profiles have to be considered as 
nothing more than mean values that are sociologically meaningless because of the 
strong variation induced by these phases. This implies, more specifically, that women’s 
employment rates are at a time over- and then underestimated by such figures, since 
there are typical phases with much higher rates than the mean and other no less typical 
phases with much lower rates. For the study of systematically changing participation 
profiles in the individuals’ lifetime and the consequences of these changes (which this 
contribution has no room to treat), the inclusion of the life-course dimension and of 
longitudinal data proves to be indispensable. 
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Hammer; it uses mainly the data produced by our common research project « Social stratification, 
cohesion and conflict in contemporary families » (Kellerhals et al. 2003), financed by the Swiss National 
Science Foundation (grant # 5004-47772). It goes without saying that the responsibility for this text and its 
shortcomings is entirely the authors’. All comments are welcome ; please address them to R. Levy, Lema-
nic institute for life-course studies, University of Lausanne, Bâtiment Provence, CH-1015 Lausanne, Swit-
zerland, or Rene.Levy@ias.unil.ch. 
ii A demographic peculiarity with respect to current ideas about the « demographic transition » that Swit-
zerland shares with other Western countries is a marked baby boom during the fourty years starting with 
World War II (1938-1978), culminating in the middle of the 60ies (Calot et al. 1998). 
iii This caustic remark may need an explication. Under the hypothesis that important parts of actual fami-
ly structures may be more influenced by the institutional environment in which they are embedded than 
by the partners’ values – we will come to this thesis later – it is easy to imagine that partners who have, 
say, egalitarian convictions, but are more or less forced to adapt to their context in a non-egalitarian way, 
may develop, together or – more plausibly– individually, strong tensions that may eventually produce 
the couple’s dissolution. 
iv Certainly one of the oldest hypotheses in this area, starting no later than with sociological functiona-
lism ; any quotation would be arbitrary. 
v The feminist literature generally identifies this border as separating the private from the public sphere, 
securing women’s traditional confinement to the former. 
vi Our concept of cohesion designates the way a couple handles its boundaries: internal boundaries bet-
ween the individual member and the group (mainly in terms of autonomy vs. fusion), and external 
boundaries between the group and its environment (mainly in terms of closure vs. openness towards the 
extrafamilial world), and the primary orientation of the group (internal vs. external locus of its main pro-
jects or objectives). 
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vii Although this reference from political sociology is rarely present in family power studies, it may be 
helpful even if there are important differences between a local community and a family or a couple. 
viii A series of cluster analyses of 25 items belonging mostly to four batteries of questions concerning rela-
tional roles, instrumental roles, decisional power and routinization produced a five-fold typology com-
bining the components of these dimensions in varying profiles, showing their intricate if not mechanical 
interrelationships. The presentation and use of this typology is beyond the purpose of the present contri-
bution (see chapter 3 in Kellerhals et al. 2003). According to this analysis, 23% of our couples can be clas-
sified as « traditionally gendered », another 23% is relatively close to it. About 36% of the couples have a 
clearly more egalitarian structure. The female share in family work is clearly highest in the two most ine-
galitarian types. 
ix This couple response rate would correspond to individual response rates of 56% if combined without 
interdepence (which may or may not be a realistic assumption in our case). 
x Since we explicitly include care, but also in order to stress the existential similarity between occupatio-
nal and family work, we shall consistently use the latter term instead of housework or the like. This 
should not be understood as a neglect of the sociologically important differences existing between these 
two types of work as a function of the very different contexts that organize them; it is on the contrary 
meant to underline them. 
xi We do not systematically compare our results with other Western countries, which would be another 
study. Tendencies towards more egalitarian forms of organization have already been identified in the 
80ies (Höpflinger & Charles 1990), but remain generally modest. - Readers familiar with repeated Euro-
pean or larger surveys like the ISSP or Eurobarometer (like one anonymous referee) might wonder why 
no reference is made to these. Unfortunately, Switzerland started to participate in these two and other 
internationally comparable surveys only recently, beginning in 1998 (ISSP). Before, there were only two 
limited participations in the ISSP (1987, 1993). The recent international Family and Fertility Survey has 
also been conducted in Switzerland, but its questions about family organization are framed in a way that 
does not allow for comparisons with earlier Swiss studies. The same holds true for the Swiss labour force 
survey (SAKE) that included modules on unpaid work only in 1997 and 2000, a period too short for our 
present interests. The best source of information about existing social science data on Switzerland is 
SIDOS, the Swiss Information and Date Archive Service for the Social Sciences (http://www.sidos.ch). 
xii Unfortunately, even semantically very similar items have not always been worded identically. While 
the first and third source (preceding footnote) used identical wordings of the questions and answers, 
Hoffmann-Nowotny et al. (1984 : 192) had a not quite comparable formulation of answer items. Thus, 
their figures must be interpreted as very approximative indications with respect to the other surveys. 
Their question concerned the frequency of men’s helping with five household chores and have been re-
coded in a rather generous way : « regularly » as man, « frequently » as joint, and « sometimes », « rare-
ly » and « never » as « woman ». Kellerhals et al. (2003) asked for the proportion of all the work being 
done by the respondent as compared with her/his partner ; « practically all » and « about three quarters » 
are considered to mean that the respective activity is accomplished mainly by the respondent, « half » to 
mean « joint », « quarter » or less have been equated to the partner. Moreover, the reader should bear in 
mind that most of these surveys have been conducted on the national level, which implies, in the case of 
Switzerland, the use of questionnaires in two or three languages (German, French, Italian). Comparisons 
have therefore to allow for some variation due to purely linguistic reasons ; making them depend on the 
condition of strictly identically wording would simply make no sense. Obviously, the same holds true for 
the English captions in the tables of this paper which have in fact never been used as such in these sur-
veys. 
xiii The sources are, by year of survey: 1971 : Held & Levy 1974; 1980 : Hoffmann-Nowotny et al. 1984; 
1991 : Levy et al. 1997; 1998 : Kellerhals et al. (2003). The sample of the 1980 survey (Hoffmann-Nowotny 
et al.) was restricted to relatively young, married Swiss couples, i.e., national couples married between 
1970 and 1980, and living in the two major language regions (German and French, without the Ticino, the 
Italian-speaking part of the country which tends to be rather traditionalistic in family matters and ac-
counts for  8% of the total population). The three others included the adult age range between 20 and 70 
years and were conducted in all linguistic regions of the country ; the 1971 sample was representative of 
married couples (which left most probably only very few unmarried couples out, given the period), the 
1991 one included individuals without consideration of their marital status, but the relevant questions 
were only asked to the subsample of people living together with a partner ; the 1998 sample, also, in-
cluded heterosexual couples living together since at least one year without consideration of their being 
married or not. Given all these differences and the N, calculating significance tests does not seem to be 
adequate. We cannot statistically exclude that the sampling differences account for some part of the per-
centage differences we wish to interpret, but we feel that there can only be speculations about their in-
fluence (especially, the 1980 sample may be biased towards less traditionalism since it excludes the Ita-
lian-speaking minority and older couples). As a safeguard, we only take into consideration reasonably 
large differences over the whole period. 
xiv Nevertheless, Strub & Bauer (2002) indicate that retrospective self-report questions, compared to time-
budget accounts, underestimate the number of weekly hours for family work by about three for women 
and overestimate it by about three for men, resulting in a serious underestimation of women’s share. 
40 
                                                                                                                                                       
However, since our interest here is not in precise statistics about time volumes, but in interrelations bet-
ween partners’ activities, this problem needs not be addressed specifically in our further analyses. 
xv Strub & Bauer (2002) find some rather modest decreases in inequality for a recent and short period, 
1997 through 2000, and some indications going in the same direction for a longer period (1980-2000), for 
which, however, the available data lack the appropriate precision. 
xvi The items can be found in table 1. Let us repeat that according to Strub & Bauer (2002) our figures pro-
bably underestimate the extent of inequality. 
xvii In the same vein, for the USA, Cherlin (1981, 1992, p. 58) reports a strong decrease between 1970 and 
1989 of the acceptance of statements like « It is much better for everyone involved if the man is the 
achiever outside the home and the woman takes care of the home and family »  (ca. 80% -> 25%), or « A 
preschool child is likely to suffer if his or her mother works », and a corresponding increase of « A 
working mother can establish just as warm a relationship with her children as a mother who does not 
work ». 
xviii Such a test had not been planned at the outset. As some answer distributions (concerning several as-
pects of cohesion and regulation) provoked a suspicion of normative bias, we had to improvise in order 
to  control for such effects at least approximately. The logic used consisted in counting among all the 
items in each of five answer batteries the supposedly most normative answer and giving a respondent 
one « point of conformism » if he/she gave consistently the most normative answer to all the items of the 
same battery. We used various forms of this logic according to the variables in the analysis in order to 
avoid tautologies.  We did find confirmations of a desirability bias, but it is restricted to simple, one-
dimensional answer displacements. The answer distributions of several of our dimensions of family func-
tioning turned out to be influenced by normative conformism. However, the relations we found when 
analyzing these dimensions, e.g., concerning their association with life course phases or status variables 
(mainly, regression coefficients), where not affected. 
xix  Same sources as table 1. 
xx Asking directly could be another way of avoiding this problem. Our questionnaire included the ou-
tright question « All well considered and frankly speaking : who is the boss in your couple? ». This way 
of questioning can be assimilated to the reputational approach to power identification. The question al-
lowed for two non-typed answers, « both equally » and « none ». The answers showed again the tenden-
cy toward equality, combined with a clear leaning toward male dominance. 
xxi In table 3 and the following analyses, the two evaluations of each descriptive statement (OK, resent) 
have been collapsed as this dimension is not of direct interest here. It goes without saying that the 
answers indicating dependence have been inverted for one partner (equating his declaring of his depen-
dence with her declaring of her partner's dependence and the reverse) so that the   can really be interpre-
ted. 
xxii In the first category, 86% of the men and 70% of the women are retired. About half of the remaining 
men (5.4%) are unemployed, the other half are ill or handicapped (6.0%). The second reason of non-em-
ployment of the female partners is housework or children at home. In the atypical category, 37.9% of the 
men are not employed, 54.7% of them because of retirement, 16.0% because of unemployment, and 20% 
because of illness or handicap. The other two thirds of the men in these couples work part-time, i.e., their 
employment rate is less than 90%. 
xxiii Retrospective biographical data, otherwise not used in this paper (cfr. Widmer et al. 2003), confirm 
this statement : about 85% of our male respondents have employment trajectories that clearly correspond 
to the classical 3-phase model : education, full-time employment, retirement. Only about 15% have trajec-
tories with interruptions or spells of part-time work. The female trajectories fall into four patterns (and a 
tiny residual category od 4%) the most frequent of which counts 34% of all the cases. This pattern comes 
closest to the traditional model. It consists of a sequence of initial education followed by a rather short 
period of full-time employment, followed in turn by a long period of full-time family work, and no 
subsequent return to the labour market. We can add that age differences appear to intervene only very 
specifically in these patterns, their main impact being among women who stay in the labour market, in 
that the older do so more often through part-time work, while the younger more often maintain a full-
time employment. Unfortunately, these truly longitudinal data cannot be used for the analyses of this 
article since it would make no sense to ask people in later phases of their lives about their earlier work 
load for the family and employment, expressed in hours, for periods that may lie many years back. 
xxiv This does of course not exclude that many of these women maintain their employment for other than 
strictly monetary reasons, such as autonomy, intrinsic work motivation, or the intention to increase their 
occupational activity later on. 
xxv The income indications are graded into 11 classes. 
xxvi It is also interesting to note that while the proportions of the correlations are roughly the same for the 
two estimates of the household income, the correlation of the individual income with the person’s own 
indication of the household income is higher than with the partner’s indication, possibly indicating a 
higher coherence « inside » each partner’s perceptional universe. 
xxvii Remember that most of the couples with none of the partners employed are retired. 
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xxviii Let us recall that in  this category, the man is occupied, but less than full time (table 4). It contains 
12.8% of all the couples, 8.4% with a higher employment rate for the woman, 2.6% with the same, and 
4.1% with a higher rate for the man. Its abbreviation by « M < W » is strictly correct only for half of the 
couples in this category. 
xxix The men's answers show the same pattern, but supplanted by an additional tendency to name slightly 
more often the man and less often the woman as the one who would adjust. Nevertheless, overall the 
woman is clearly preferred for this function by both sexes. 
xxx It may not be safe to interpret the difference between the two symetric cases of one-sided dependency, 
but the difference between the 34% in independent couples and 59% in « symetrically » interdependent 
couples is striking. As we know nothing about the semantic or conceptual difference between the two 
intermediate situations, an ordinal correlation coefficient is problematic (let us nevertheless note that 
gamma would be  =.24); Cramer's V = .12 (highly significant). 
xxxi In interpreting these results, we should not forget that about 17% of the men in our sample are retired 
whereas 75% (or 90% of the non-retired) are full-time employed. 
xxxii This interpretation is confirmed by results of Strub & Bauer (2002) and comparable ones from seven 
other European countries (Willemsen & Jacobs 2001), showing, among others, relatively constant and 
similar overall working hours for men as well as for women living in couples when family work and 
occupational work are added up. 
xxxiii For a discussion of American studies of the relationship between spouses’ occupational and family 
work hours, see, e.g., Shelton 1999. Our main result is consistent with her summary statement that « paid 
work time has a greater effect on women’s than on men’s household labor » (p.  383). Let us add that our 
results give only limited credibility to the time availability approach. Quite substantial and problematic 
additional suppositions about the differential « urgency » of employment and family activities would be 
needed to derive such results from this explanatory model. See also Bielby & Bielby (1989). 
xxxiv The age-distribution of the question whether childless respondents planned to have some later 
showed no single positive response above 36 years of age (women), a limit that seems to correspond to a 
widespread perception of a biological deadline (« biological clock »). We use this age limit to distinguish 
childless couples (woman over 36) from pre-child couples. 
xxxv A comparison of the parallel relationship of male and female employment rates with age and with 
family phases shows quite clearly that male rates are more strongly related to age, with the official reti-
rement age (65) as a point of inflexion, whereas female rates are more strongly related to the family 
phases. According to various checks that cannot be shown here for reasons of space, there are no clear-cut 
indications of cohort differences within family phases. 
xxxvi The relatively high rate of atypical employment constellations in the two initial phases and the last 
one is largely due to the man having not yet completed his initial education for the first two, and being 
retired for the last. Couples without children have been added to this table (while not present in the 
graphs) to give the possibility to compare; this group is defined as having no children on both sides and 
the woman’s age being over 36. As already stated, these couples have an extremely low probability to 
have a child. 
xxxvii The median hours in childless couples are 36.4 for women and 6.2 for men, with a ratio of 5.9. 
xxxviii Men’s Model B has been chosen to be a mirror image of women’s Model B. Since these regression 
analyses are not our main interest, we do not systematically compare all logically possible configurations 
of model variables.  
xxxix A multiple regression analysis, published in another paper (Levy & Ernst 2002), confirms this intepre-
tation. 
xl Let us note in passing that resource theory would suggest a negative correlation, since it would predict 
that on the basis of his financial contribution to the satisfaction of the couple’s needs, a full-time em-
ployed man (and more so if his income is high, which we did not include) would be able to get a com-
plete discharge from the less prestigious family work. Put cynically, we could say that this discharge 
exists anyway quite generally and seems to need no backing by specific resource contributions. Neverthe-
less, some other results tend to confirm resource theory, especially the association between women’s edu-
cation and their employment rate (and this rate’s resilience « against » the family phases). 
xli This is a reference to findings of a previous study on stratification and mobility (Levy et al. 1997) not 
presented here. Our findings correspond to German results and are also confirmed by Crompton (2001) 
for other European countries (Britain, Norway). We hypothesize that the specific form, variability and 
extent of sex-specific career models depend on societal gender regimes that in turn vary according to 
each society’s institutional profile and its respective basic social-political orientations (such as those iden-
tified by Korpi 2000).  
xlii More generally, we feel that in the complex system of interdependencies of gender, family organiza-
tion, life course and social inequalities, it makes little sense to expect any single theory to be clearly more 
relevant than its contenders. It seems much more fruitful to seek to establish which of the various me-
chanisms identified by different theoretical approaches are relevant for which element or under which 
circumstances, since they appear to be complementary rather than mutually exclusive. 
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xliii This interpretation is partly in tune with the theoretical tendency Coltrane (2000) calls « institutional 
influences », except for the fact that we establish a direct connection between the dimension of the (fairly 
institutionalized) life-course of individuals and the family which he treats as a separate aspect. 
